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PREFACE 
This is meant to be an expository paper. Its goal is to present several 
recent major developments in set theory. We shall be writing for a general 
audience, and despite the technical limitations this imposes on us, we will 
prove several deep theorems, a number of which have traditional 
mathematical interest quite apart from any considerations of logic. Our main 
hope is to do justice to the power and beauty of the techniques involved and, 
in general, to capture some of the excitement surrounding the field. 
Strictly speaking, the only prerequisite for an understanding of what 
follows is a sound foundation in undergraduate mathematics. 
The only notion specifically from set theory with which we shall assume 
familiarity is that of “ordinal number.” For those who are unfamiliar with 
this concept perhaps this will help: the nonnegative integers 0, 1, 2... are the 
finite ordinal numbers, To get all the ordinal numbers one should simply 
continue counting. The first infinite ordinal is called w, the next w + 1, then 
w + 2, w + 3, 0 + 4, w + 5 ,I.. eventually 0 + w, w t w t 1, w t 0 + 2,... 
0 + 0 + o,... w ’ LL), 0 * w + l,... and so forth. For our purposes, the two key 
facts about the ordinals are these: (1) the collection of ordinals forms a well- 
ordering, that is, the ordinals are linearly ordered and every nonempty set of 
ordinals has a least member; and (2) there exist “arbitrarily many” ordinals, 
that is, given any set there exists a set of ordinals which is so large that it 
cannot be mapped one-to-one into the set. 
One more word before we begin: except in a few cases of theorems 
commonly referred to via their discoverer’s name, we will not attribute credit 
for theorems, or proofs, in the body of the text. Such acknowledgements wilt 
be given later, just prior to the list of references. 
1 
The field of mathematical logic has not been particularly successful in 
discovering the logic of mathematics. Indeed, aside from seemingly super- 
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ticial formalisms, a working theory of mathematical practice simply does not 
exist. What has, from a foundational point of view, been the major success of 
logic is the description of the limits of various aspects of mathematics. 
Results along these lines range from the abstract theorems of GBdel stating 
that, associated with any given notion of mathematical proof (which is 
consistent and deductive in nature), there will be statements of mathematics 
which are neither provable nor disprovable, to the more recent concrete 
independence theorems in set theory showing that particular well-known 
mathematical statements are neither provable nor disprovable. 
Let us be more specific concerning these independence results. During the 
early portion of the 20th century. a formal axiomatic theory known as 
ZermeleFraenkel set theory, or ZF, was developed to serve as a foundation 
for mathematics. Its motivation was as follows: so far as anyone had been 
able to determine. all standard mathematical notions were representable in 
the language of sets. The theory ZF was created by simply listing a 
collection of natural axioms about sets (for example: “two sets are equal if 
they have the same members”; or “given sets s and 1’ there exists a set whose 
members are precisely the sets x and v”) along with the standard rules of 
logical inference. At any rate, with the inclusion of the axiom of choice, the 
resulting theory, ZFC. seemed (and still seems) to be general enough to 
contain virtually all of mathematics. This is not to imply that 
mathematicians have the axioms or rules of ZFC in mind when they work, 
or that they even know these axioms and rules. We are only saying that to 
the extent to which it has been possible to judge, if one took the trouble to 
translate mathematics into the language of sets, the theory of ZFC would be 
broad enough to prove any theorem tried. The virtue of this is that in ZFC 
we have a very simple and easy to use representation of the runge qj’ 
mathematics or, more precisely, of the range of what mathematicians 
currently think of as mathematics. And such a representation is almost 
essential if one is to prove results about the limits of this range. What we 
have in mind is this: occasionally a mathematician must make special 
assumptions in proving a desired theorem and he naturally questions whether 
or not the special assumptions themselves can be proved. The continuum 
hypothesis, for example, is sometimes used in proving theorems in 
mathematics’-is the continuum hypothesis itself provable? Well. if we 
consider the mathematically concrete theory ZFC as embodying the realm of 
acceptable proof, the answer is a definitive no. This, the famous indcpen- 
dence result of Cohen, in effect puts a very specific bound on mathematics in 
its present form. 
As with Glidel’s celebrated results of thirty years earlier, much misun- 
derstanding followed the announcement of Cohen’s work. The continuum 
I For example, the Von Neumann-Stone lifting theorem. 
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hypothesis is still either true or false-nothing can change that. It is just that 
ZFC is not sufficiently rich to decide which. 
Fortunately, mathematics tends to expand. This happens both through the 
discovery of new concepts and techniques, and through the introduction, 
increased use, and general acceptance of new principles. Sometimes, as 
evidenced by the evolution of nonstandard analysis, work which initially 
seems dependent upon new principles or axioms turns out to be accessible 
without them. 
In this paper we examine a technique of D. A. Martin which grew out of 
work associated with various new mathematical axioms. Two examples of 
proofs involving Martin’s technique will be given. One of these is dependent 
upon such a new axiom for set theory and the other is not. Although we do 
not wish to discuss here the virtue of pursuing a systematic study of new 
axioms, it is important to note the following: when proving theorems from 
even the most exotic, unnatural, or implausible axioms there is often 
associated a realistic hope of establishing the very same results without the 
special axioms. For such axioms or hypotheses tend to present an 
atmosphere of conceptual or notational simplicity from which various 
techniques or methods naturally develop. A typical scenario may go as 
follows: one first proves a theorem using a special axiom and then carefully 
examines his proof, however complicated this analysis may become, to see 
just how much of the power of the axiom was really needed to establish the 
result. Hopefully he will find that for the context at hand some modification 
of the axiom which is provable outright in ZF is all that is needed. In this 
case he would have his result as a theorem of ZF by a method he never 
would have discovered directly. This precise thing has happened and we shall 
see an example of it later. 
It would be unrealistic at this point to discuss Martin’s method per se. 
However, in order to tantalize the reader, we might mention the following: 
although our main theorems are facts about “small” sets such as the set of 
reals, their proofs draw heavily upon the existence of extremely large sets, 
some much larger than 
the set of sets of G of sets of reals. 
infinite 
What possibly bearing can the existence of large sets have on proving facts 
about small sets? We don’t wish to sound overly melodramatic but the 
solution is simple yet striking and shall unfold as we proceed. 
Remark. Since not all readers of this paper will have the same 
backgrounds or interests, it might be helpful for us to make a number of 
remarks concerning the organization and structure of this paper, and in 
AXIOMATIC SET THEORY 179 
particular to point out which sections are very difficult or technical and to 
what extent they can be circumvented. As the title and introduction suggest, 
this paper can be thought of as an exposition of a number of related large 
cardinal properties and of related applications of these properties to results 
about sets of real numbers. In the section immediately following this general 
introduction, Section 2, we begin with a very elementary discussion of the 
notion of one abstract set being larger than another and lead naturally from 
this into a first approximation of the sorts of large cardinal properties to be 
considered later. Section 2 is thus an introduction to our subsequent work 
with large cardinal properties and it is short and easy. In Section 3 we 
introduce a notion related to sets of real numbers. It is to results about this 
notion that we will later apply our large cardinal properties. Section 3 is 
basically easy except for a theorem in it about Lebesgue measure, a theorem 
which should be of interest and enjoyment to those who are familiar with 
Lebesgue measure but which, since its purpose is mainly motivational, may 
he skipped by those who are not. Section 4 begins with an easy theorem but 
proceeds rapidly to a proof of the first main theorem of the paper. It is in 
this theorem that we present an application of the properties of Section 2 to 
proving an instance of the notion of Section 3, and although the proof is 
long, it contains interesting ideas and is not too difftcult to follow. In 
Section 5 we present another application of large cardinal properties to 
results about sets of reals. Here, however, the application is far more 
sophisticated. In this section we will evolve from the sort of very simple large 
cardinal properties of Section 2, a much more refined sort of large cardinal 
property, and we shall apply the refined property to proving a much more 
general instance of the notion of Section 3. The proof associated with this 
application is difficult and may be skipped, but it is of extreme interest and 
is certainly worth the effort of understanding. Section 6 is the concluding 
section. It discusses in some detail the relined sort of large cardinal property 
introduced at the beginning of Section 5 and concludes with a number of 
remarks about large cardinal properties in general. This section is basically 
easy. 
Hopefully this outline will help in reading what follows. Keep in mind that 
you can always return to it to regain any eroded perspective, 
2 
During the course of this paper we shall be dealing with various properties 
of “large” sets. Rather than pull these out of thin air let us attempt to arrive 
at them naturally. 
The key property of “large” sets on which we plan to build is embodied in 
the so-called pigeon-hole principk: if a “large” set is partitioned into a 
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%mall” number of pieces, then one of the pieces must contain a “large” 
number of elements. But what do we mean by the words “large” and “small” 
as applied to arbitrary sets? These terms are of course relative. The generally 
accepted definition is that one set x is of greater cardinal@ than a set y (or, 
simply, is larger than u) if there does not exist a one to one mapping of x 
into 4’. Thus if x is of greater cardinality than y, then given any function f 
from x into y, f must fail to be one to one, that is, there must exist distinct 
members p and 9 of x such that f( p) = J(Q). As we can easily see, this is 
just an instance of the pigeon-hole principle, for a mapping from a set x into 
a set y is really the same as a partition of x into “‘y many” pieces the 
“rth piece” of the partition, for r a member of y, being simply f- ‘{r}, the set 
of p in x such that f( p) = r. 
But the pigeon-hole principle goes well beyond direct consequences of the 
definition of cardinality. Here is an example: “if an infinite set is partitioned 
into a finite number of pieces then one of the pieces will be infinite.” By 
viewing partitions as functions as above we might write this “any function 
with infinite domain and finite range is constant on an infinite set.” 
The pigeon-hole principle is well known to mathematics. A prime example 
appears in the proof of the Bolzan+Weierstrass theorem which states that 
every infinite bounded set of reals has a limit point. For if S is an infinite 
bounded set of reals, the proof proceeds as follows: since S is bounded it 
intersects finitely many intervals of the form Ii, i + l), where i is an integer, 
and hence the members of S can be viewed as being partitioned into finitely 
many pieces according to which of these finitely many intervals they lie in. 
Thus by the pigeon-hole principle, since S is infinite, infinitely many 
members of S must all lie in some one interval, say [i,, i, f 1). (We may 
assume, without loss of generality, that i, > 0.) Let S, be the infinite subset 
of S contained in [i, , i, + 1). Then if we view 1 i, , i, + 1) as consisting of the 
ten subintervals [i,, i, + l/10). Ii, + l/10, i, + 2/10),..., Ii, + 9/10. i, + I). 
another use of the pigeon-hole principle tells us that an infinite subset S,, of 
S, is contained entirely within ii, t i,/lO, i, + i, + l/10) for some integer i,, 
0 ,< i, < 10. Now dividing [i, + i,/lO. i, + i, + l/10) into ten successive 
subintervals and applying the pigeon-hole principle again we define iz and 
S,, and eventually i, and S, , i, and S,, i, and S, , and so forth ad infinitum. 
It is routine to now check that i,. i, i2i3i4is . . . is a decimal expansion of a 
desired limit point of our original set S. 
The applications of the pigeon-hole principle and of related large cardinal 
axioms to be considered as we proceed will be entirely different from this 
one. For even though the theorems to be proved will still be about sets of 
real numbers, the sets being pigeon-holed will be sets which are much larger 
than the set of real numbers. 
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In this section we introduce the idea of a given set of reals being “deter- 
minate.” It is notationally best to do this in terms of two-person games of 
infinite length, but as an initial (and necessarily vague) description, we might 
say that “determinateness” is an attempt to impose some sort of uniformity 
on a given set of reals in terms of a continuous function. 
We begin by looking at the reals themselves. In particular we would like 
LO set up some method for specifying real numbers which avoids the usual 
ambiguities inherent with decimals, that is, for example, the problem 
associated with the fact that l.OOOOO... and 0.99999... both represent the 
same number. Our solution will be to view reals in so called infinitary 
expansion. Under this system reals2 correspond to infinite sequences of 
nonnegative integers and this correspondence is unique-every infinite 
sequence corresponds to a unique real and every real has corresponding to it 
a unique sequence. How do we find such intinitary expansions? Quite 
simply, as follows: suppose r is a given real, Then as in Section 2, the 
decimal expansion of r is found by dividing 10, 11 into ten successive subin- 
tervals and seeing which subinterval r lies in, dividing this subinterval into 
ten successive subsubintervals and seeing which of these r lies in, and so 
forth. In finding infinitary expansions we do the same but here each time 
dividing intervals into infinitely many subintervals, a typical interval [a, b] 
being divided into [a, (a + 6)/2), [(a + 6)/Z, (3/4)(a + b)), [ (3/4)(a + 6), 
(7/8)(u + b)), [ (7/8)(a + b), (lS/ 16)(a + b)),... . Thus, for example, 
I. 0,2. I,... is the infinitary expansion of the unique real number which 
simultaneously lies in [I/2, 3/4), [l/2, 5/S), [19/32, 39/64), [79/128, 
159/256),.... 
Keeping in mind this way of viewing reals as infinite sequences of 
nonnegative integers we proceed as follows: let W denote the collection of all 
infinite sequences of nonnegative integers. Given a subset A of W there exists 
a game G, played between two players I and II as follows: I initiates play by 
writing a nonnegative integer n,. II responds by writing a nonnegative 
integer IZ,. I then writes a nonnegative integer n3, II responds with n4, I with 
n,. II with nb, I with II,, and so forth ad infinitum. When they have 
“finished” the result is a real number, that is, an infinite sequence of 
nonnegative integers n, ~ nz, n3, n4, n5,..., and the payoff of this play of G, is 
that I wins iff that real n,, n,. n3, n,, n, ,.., is a member of A. Thus as I and 
II are playing I tries to make the sequence wind up in A and II tries to keep 
it out. A strategy for such a game is simply a function from the set of finite 
sequences of nonnegative integers into the set of nonnegative integers, the 
‘Throughout the remainder of this paper we wili restrict our attention exclusively to the 
real numbers in the interval 10, 11. 
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idea being that a player using the strategyf would writef(n,, n, ... n,) as his 
move following the initial play n,, n,,..., ni. A strategy is said to be a 
winning strategy for a given game G,, if a player using the strategy always 
wins. 
It is clear that for any such game the two players can never both possess 
winning strategies. But does some one of them always have a winning 
strategy, that is, for each set A does there exist a winning strategy for one of 
the players of G, ? Assuming the axiom of choice, the answer is no, for if 
one can well-order the set of reals he can fairIy easily diagonalize over all 
possible winning strategies and put together a set A such that no player has a 
winning strategy for G,. 
This situation is unfortunate for if winning strategies always did exist for 
such games mathematicians would have powerful tools from which many 
wonderful results would follow, Here is a sample: 
THEOREM.~ Assume that fur every set A of reals there exists a winning 
strategy for GA. Then every set of reals is Lebesggue measurable. 
Remark. Before launching into the technicalities of proving the theorem 
at hand we might make some vague remarks about the argument to be used. 
As expected, the problem will quickly reduce to our seeking an open 
covering of small measure for a given set, and such a covering we shall be 
able to produce quite easily from a winning strategy for a particular game to 
be defined. The idea is that the strategy will choose a covering for each 
individual point in our given set in a uniformly continuous way: the closer 
together two points in our set are, the more similar their coverings will be. 
Because of this the resulting covering of the entire set will be extremely 
efficient, that is, will cover the set as closely as possible. 
ProoJ It is routine to see that in order to show every set of reals 
Lebesgue measurable it suffices to show that any set of reals with inner 
measure 0 has outer measure 0, This can easily be done as follows: suppose 
that B is a set with inner measure 0 and let E > 0 be given. We wish to find 
an open covering of B having measure GE. (Without loss of generality we 
can clearly assume that B is a subset of the interval [0, 11). NOW it is clear 
that one can systematically assign to each finite union of open intervals with 
rational endpoints a unique nonnegative integer-one way to do this might 
be to assign to the union of (il/i2, i3/i4), (i,/i,, &/is),..., (iJik+l, ik+2/ik+3) 
the number 2’13f25’37’41 If5 . . . pk . . . pg$, where p,, is the nth prime number. 
At any rate, assuming that some such coding of intervals in terms of 
3 In considering this theorem and its proof our context will. of course, be one without the 
axiom of choice. 
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numbers is specified, let us consider the infinite game whose playoff is as 
follows: player II wins the play n,, n2, n3, n,, ns ,... if both 
(1) his individual moves n2, n,. n6, n,, n,,,... are the code numbers for 
a sequence of unions of intervals such that for each i the union of intervals 
coded by nSi has measure less than ~/2~‘, and 
(2) if player l’s moves, n,, n3. II~, n,, n9 ,..., when written 
.n, n3 n, n, n, . . , happen to constitute a binar~~ expansion of a member of 3, 
then that member of B lies in one of the unions of intervals coded by 
nz, “4. n(j. Ilg, n,,,.... 
Now although we used lots of words to describe this game it is routine to see 
that for some set A contained in IV, I and II are just playing G,. Thus, by 
the hypothesis of our theorem, letfbe a winning strategy for this game. Now 
if we can prove that f is actually a winning strategy for player II we would 
have our desired cover. For in this case, by the definition of the game, it is 
easy to see that if Q denotes the collection of all those unions of intervals 
whose code numbers appear as f is played against all possible sequences of 
O’s and l’s as I’s moves, then Q constitutes an open covering of B of 
measure as most E. Thus to complete our proof we need only show that 
player I can Izetier have a winning strategy for the game described above. 
With one simple observation and one well-known fact, though, this is easy. 
For suppose g were a winning strategy for player I for the above game. Then 
we can view g as entailing a map g* from ]O, 1 ] into i0, l] defined as 
follows: given a real r in 10, I ] let n2, n4, n6, n,, n,,,... be r’s unique 
infinitary expansion. Then g*(r) is defined to be the real with binary 
expanston .n, n3 n5 n, n, ,.,., where n,, n3, n5, n,, n, ,... is such that n,. n,, n3. 
n,, n5, n,. n7. n,, n,, n,,,... is the play of G, where g is used against player 
II playing n,, iz4. f16, n,, lr,O ,.... Now it is routine to see that g* is continuous 
at each irrational and hence if we denote by P the range of g*, P is a SO- 
called analytic set. Also, since g is assumed to be a winning strategy for 
player I, P is a subset of B. But as is well known, analytic sets are Lebesgue 
measurable and thus, as the inner measure of B is 0, P must have measure 0. 
So let n,, n4, nh, n,, n,, ,... be a sequence of integers with the property that 
the unions of intervals coded by them form an open covering of P and that 
for any i the union of intervals coded by n,, has measure at most ~/2~‘. Then 
if II simply plays the integers n,, n,, n6, n,, n,,,... against I’s playing via the 
strategy g the definition of P and of n,, n4, n6, n,, n,,,... easily tells us that 
the resulting play is a win for II. This contradicts the assumption that g is a 
winning strategy for I and so our theorem follows. B 
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As we mentioned early in Section 3. there are sets A such that neither 
player has a winning strategy for G,. Let us call a set A of reals4 such that 
some player DOES have a winning strategy for G, determinate. As we hope 
the theorem just proved begins to indicate, the question of which sets of reals 
are determinate is a mathematically important one. Indeed, the idea of using 
winning strategies for various games to “continuously uniformize” sets of 
reals has been applied with great success to mathematical contexts besides 
measure theory, often with striking results, and it is likely that such 
techniques have yet to fully develop. 
Well, then, which sets of reals are determinate? As an initial result, it is 
fairly easy to see that open sets are: 
THEOREM. I’ A is an open set of reals then A is determinate. 
Pro& Suppose that A is open. We wish to find a winning strategy for 
some player of G,. The key property associated with A’s being open, and 
that upon which our proof hinges, is the following: if a real 
n,, n,, n3, n4, n5,... is a member of A then it is forced to be so as a result of 
some initial segment, that is, for some initial segment n,, n,,..., ni of the real 
any real which begins with n,, n2,.,., n, is a member of A. At any rate, we 
proceed as follows: suppose that player I does not have a winning strategy 
for G,. Then consider the strategy for II whereby at each of his moves II 
writes the least natural number so that from I’s very next move on he still 
has no winning strategy. That is, after I’s first move n, II writes the least 
integer n, so that from I’s very next move on he still has no winning strategy. 
{If it is impossible for 11 to make such a move here then I clearly had a 
winning strategy from the very beginning of the game, contradicting our 
initial assumption). I then writes n3 and II responds with n4, the least 
nonnegative integer such that from move 5 on I still has no winning strategy. 
And so forth. Now although we described this II strategy with lots of words 
it clearly corresponds to a formal strategy as defined earlier, and we cl&z 
that this is in fact a wirrning strategy for f1 far G,. For suppose 
n,, n,, n3, n4, n,,... is a play of G, with II using this strategy in which he 
lost. Then since A is open there is an integer i such that any real beginning 
n,. n,,..., ni is a member of A. But this implies that when it came to I’s very 
next move of the play of this game after the ith he did have a winning 
strategy-he could, in fact, have done anything and still won. This 
contradicts the fact that II played in such a way that at every initial stage of 
’ Recall that we are thinking of infinite sequences of nonnegative integers as reals (and vice 
versa) through the notion of infinitary expansion. 
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play I never had a winning strategy to complete play. The theorem is thus 
established. 1 
The remainder of our paper will basically be devoted to examining the 
question of which sets are determinate. As it turns out. things become 
difficult once we look at sets more elaborate than open sets. For example, it 
was quite a while after open sets were observed to be determinate that coun- 
table intersections of open sets (so-called G, sets) were proved detekminate, 
and the another good numher of years before countable unions of G,‘s (so 
called G,,‘s) were shown to be determinate. A natural question to ask is “Is 
every Bore1 set of reals determinate ?” This had been one of the main open 
problems in set theory for many years and was just recently resolved by 
Martin in the affirmative. 
What we shall eventually present in the next section is a proof of a 
stronger fact namely that every analytic set is determinate.’ Unlike Martin’s 
recent proof of Bore1 determinateness, however, the proof we will use here 
(also due to Martin) will require stronger assumptions than just the axioms 
of Zerrnelo+Fraenkel set theory. This is where so called “large cardinals” 
come into play. 
The argument to be used in proving analytic sets determinate, though not 
unusually long. will be fairly subtle and so. in the way of motivatiop. let us 
introduce the basic idea by proving a simpler result, namely, that every 
countable intersection of open sets is determinate. This will not be the 
original proof of G, determinateness, but because of the simplicity of G,‘s 
relative to analytic sets we will still be able to carry out our proof entirely 
lvithin ZFC. This is because only an outright provable modification of the 
large cardinal axiom is needed to make the method work here. 
THEOREM. Ecery countable intersection of open se& is determinate. 
Proof. Suppose that B is a given countable intersection of open sets. For 
definiteness let us take B= fiErAj, where each Ai is open. Now Let us 
consider two players engaged in playing G,. As play proceeds, the real being 
produced may become “captured” by various Ai, for membership of reals in 
open sets is determined entirely by initial segments. A systematic way to 
keep track of this might be as follows: as play unfolds we shall begin listing 
those Ai which are already known to contain the real being produced. 
However, to keep things orderly we will not list any Ai unless every Aj for 
j c: i, j >, 1 has already wound up on our list, and we shall list at most one A i 
5 Kecall that a set of reals in analytic if it is equal to the range of a continuous function on 
a closed set-it is a theorem that every Bore1 set is analytic and that there exist many analytic 
sets which are not Borel. 
186 E. M. KLEINBERG 
at every stage of play of the game. The following schematic might make our 
listing process clearer: 
nnnnnnnnnn I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 n 11 n 12 n 13 n 14 n I5 n 16 n 17 n I8 a 19 n 20’ 
A, AJ, A, A5 
What we mean to represent here is that at stage 3 of play the real has first 
been captured by A,. (That is, any real beginning n, , n,, n3 is in A, but not 
so for reals beginning a, or for reals beginning n,, n,), that at stage 6 the 
real has first been captured by A,, that by stage 7 the real has been captured 
by A,, and so forth. Note that the real may have been captured by A, at 
some stage earlier than stage 7 but that since A, did not capture the real 
until stage 6 we had to wait until at least stage 7 to list A, . Now it is 
relatively clear that we have set up the following representation theorem for 
GB:aplayn,,n,,n,rz,12, ,... is not in B if and only if the listing procedure 
as described above terminates at some initial stage of play. For the first Aj 
which fails to get listed in this way fails to capture the real at any initial 
stage of play and hence, as that Ai is open, it fails to contain the real at all. 
It is on this representation theorem that our proof of G, determinateness 
hinges. The plan is to set up an auxillary game in which player I makes 
moves as before but in which player II must, besides making this integer 
moves, make special additional moves in an attempt to “prove” that the list 
of Ai being formed as associated with the integer moves terminates at a finite 
initial stage of play. It is quite easy to make this precise. Namely, let GL be a 
game between two players, I and II, played as follows: the two players move 
alternately beginning with player I. Player I writes a nonnegative integer at 
each of his moves and player II writes a nonnegative integer at each of his. 
But player II also has the option at each of his moves to write, as an 
auxillary move, an arbitrary ordinal number. The payoff is that player II 
wins a given play of Gk if and only if at each initial stage of play at which a 
new Aj gets listed (as associated with the integer moves to that point), ptayer 
II wrote, at his next available move, an auxillary ordinal which was smaller 
than any auxiliary ordinary he previously wrote, Thus an initial portion of 
play of G; might look like this: 
nln2n3 n4 % h n7nR n n 12 n n n n 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ... 
w+w w+2 o+l 5 6 
A, A, A, A4 A5 
By inspection, II has already lost this play of the game for at his 7th move 
the ordinal he wrote, 6, was too large-since the list of Ai has just grown he 
would have had to write an ordinal smaller than his previous auxillary move. 
This was a 5. If he had written a 4 here he would still be in the game but if 
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the list should grow again at least five times there would be no way for him 
to now win. Perhaps II should have played an 10 instead of a 5 at his fifth 
move. But this might have only delayed his loss and not prevented it. For 
since the collection of all ordinals forms a Ms.&ordering there does not exist 
an infinitely descending progression of ordinals. that is, a set of ordinals 
CL, ,fxz, cz3, u,,a, ,... such that u, > a, > a, > a4 > a, a.~---such a set of 
ordinals would not have a least member. 
Now Gk is an “open” game, that is, any time player I wins a particular 
piay of G;, he had already won on the basis of some finite initial stage of 
that play. This is clear. Thus by the exact same proof used to show open sets 
of reals determinate we may conclude that one of the players has a winning 
strategy for GA. Of course, strategies here look somewhat different from 
before. Functions representing strategies for player I have as their domain 
not the set of finite sequences of nonnegative integers but rather the cartesian 
product of the set of finite sequences of nonnegative integers and the set of 
finite sequences of ordinals, and strategies for player II for this auxiliary 
game are really represented by a pair of functions. the first function 
presenting the standard integer moves and the second function the auxiliary 
ordinal moves. 
At any rate. either player I or player II has a winning strategy for Gk. We 
shall complete our proof of this theorem by showing that if player I has a 
winning strategy for Gb then he has one for G, and if player II has a 
winning strategy for Gi then he has one for G,. 
Now it is essentially immediate that if player II has a winning strategy for 
Gk then he has one for G,. For if (f, g) is the pair of functions representing 
a winning strategy for II for GX. the function representing integer moves,f, is 
itself a winning strategy for II for G,. Indeed, if II plays according to f in a 
game of G, the associated list of Ai must be finite-if one bothered to play 
the moves of s off to the side, he would have written a smaller ordinal every 
time the list grew. The ordinals are wellLordered and so the list could not 
have grown forever. 
The game Gk was designed to somewhat hinder player II and so it is not 
surprising that if player 11 has a winning strategy for GI, he has one for G,. 
What is surprising is what we now prove namely that if player I has a 
winning strategy for GX then he has one for G,. Indeed, player I’s being able 
to win GA simply means that he can make integer moves in such a way as to 
ruin any particular attempt of player II at decreasing ordinals as for long as 
the associated List of Ai grows-it does not mean that the list of Ai 
associated with the integer moves would eventually grow to be infinite. 
So suppose F is a winning strategy for player I for Gk. We would like to 
somehow convert F into a winning strategy for player I for G,. How do we 
do it? For a start. the arguments of F are pairs consisting of a finite 
sequence of nonnegative integers and a finite sequence of ordinals, whereas a 
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strategy for I for G, would be a function whose arguments were just finite 
sequences of nonnegative integers. Thus if I is to use F somehow in playing 
G,, he would have to make guesses as to the auxiliary ordinal moves to 
supply F with. This is where the problem arises. For if a game were played 
in this way with I guessing at ordinals the resulting sequences of nonnegative 
integers, n,, nlr n3, n4, n, ,... would not necessarily be a win for I for G,, for 
the associated list of Ai would not necessarily be infinite. All we know is that 
the original moves guessed by I and supplied by him to F did not continue to 
decrease in size for as long as the list of Ai grew. The associated list of A i for 
n,, n,, n3, n, n5 ,..., though, may have in fact been finite. Schematically this 
may look as follows: 
Play of G, + n, n, n3 n4 ~5~6~7~8~9~,0~1,~,2~,3~,4~,,~~~ 
I’s ordinal guesses+ o+w 15 1 0 
Sequence of Ai 
associated with A, 
play of G, i 
AlA, A, A5-no moreAi 
Now as we see, the associated list of Ai is finite-since F was a winning 
strategy for 1 for the auxillary game, F just had to play out integers in such a 
way that the associated list of Ai grew for a longer period of time then the 
ordinals fed to it continued decreasing. Now some might say that I did not 
make very good guesses for the ordinals, that they simply ran dawn too 
fast-what if he had originally guessed and applied to F at the appropriate 
moments the sequence w + W, w + 10, w + 5. 250, 150. Then if everjjthing 
else remained the same (i.e., if F still plaJ)ed out the same integers against 
this new revised sequence) the result, 
nIn2n3 n4 f15 n6 n7 n8 n, n 10 n 11 n 12 n 13 n 14 n ISY” 
co+0 o+lO w+5 250 150 
would represent a play of the auxiliary game in which I used his winning 
strategy F and lost. This would be a contradiction. Now recall just what we 
are contradicting: we had described I playing G, using as a strategy F in 
conjunction with ordinal guesses, and had decided that it may not 
necessarily be a winning strategy for him for G,. Our contradiction is to it 
not being a winning strategy but only under the obviously special assumpfion 
that Ps ordinal guesses have the special property that after play is complete 
he can go back and change the sequence of ordinals without altering the 
sequence of integers spewed out by F. 
Let us make entirely precise this property I’s ordinal guesses should have 
AXIOMATIC SETTHEORY 189 
in order that his using such guesses in conjunction with F yields a winning 
strategy for I for G,. The following lemma is the key: 
LEMMA. F’or euch positive integer j there exists a nonempt)? set Cj of 
finite sequences of ordinals such that the following three properties are met: 
( I ) for al?l, j, the members of Ci are decreasing sequences 01 length j 
(2) for atly j, iJ’ (a, ,..., ai} and (p, ,..., ai> are in Ci then 
F(s, (u, ,.... Uji) = m. ty, . ..-113.)) f or any-finite sequence s of integers rt,hose 
associated list of A i has length j. 
(3) for anyj, iJ(u ,,..., a;+]) is a member of’C,, , then (a ,..... nj> is a 
member of C,. 
To see that this lemma does the trick we simply argue as follows: define 
the strategy f for 1 for G, by f(s) = F(s, (u, . . . . . ui>) where the list of Ai 
associated with the finite sequence s has lengthj and (u, ,..., ui> is in Cj (by 2 
of the lemma, it doesn’t matter which sequence from C, we use). It is now 
easy to see that f is a winning strategy for player I for G,, for if not, let 
n,, n,, n3. tz4, n5 ,... be a play of G,, where I uses f and loses. Then the 
associated sequence of Ai is finite. Suppose it has lengthj. Then if (a,,..., aj) 
is a sequence in Ci it is routine from properties (l), (2), and (3) of the 
lemma to see that the play of the auxillary game, where I plays according to 
F and II plays integers as he just did in this play of G, and plays, sequen- 
tially, the ordinals a,. ct2 I .. EL,~ at the appropriate time. is a play of Gk. 
where I uses his winning strategy F and loses. This is a contradiction. 
It only remains to establish the lemma, and this is where the pigeon-hole 
principle comes in. Indeed, the key clause in the lemma, number 2. the clause 
which says that the revised sequence can be plugged into F without changing 
Fs action, is precisely what one would get from pigeon-holing. Proceeding 
formally, we first observe that for any set there exists a set of ordinals which 
cannot be mapped l-1 into that set. This is a basic property of the ordinals 
numbers, Let then Q. be a set of ordinals which cannot be mapped 1-l into 
the set of real numbers. We “prune” QO to form a minimal such set, Q, as 
follows: if for every /.I in QO {a E Q,, 1 a < /?\ can be mapped 1-l into the set 
of reals we let Q be Q,, itself. Otherwise, where PO denotes the least ordinal p 
in Q,, such that (a E Q, 1 GI < p} cannot be mapped l-l into the set of reals, 
we let Q be (a E Qn ( a < fi,}. Now a subset A of Q is said to be unbounded 
in Q if for every ri in Q there is a p in A such that a < /3. The instance of the 
pigeon-hole principle from which we shall derive our desired lemma is the 
following: 
FACT. Given any map f from Q into the set of reals, there exists an 
unbounded subset A of Q on which f is constant. 
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Proof uffact. Let R denote the set of reals and supposefmaps Q into R. 
Iff is not constant on any unbounded subset of Q then f - ‘{P-) is a bounded 
subset of Q for every real r. But by the “minimality” of Q, every bounded 
subset of Q can be mapped l-1 into the reals and so, viewing Q as 
(JrEn,fP’{ri it is easy to see that Q could be mapped 1-l into R x R. Since 
it is well known that R x R can be mapped l-l into R we may conclude 
that Q can be mapped 1-l into R contradicting our definition of Q. The fact 
is thus proved. 
The lemma now follows routinely. 
Proof of iemma. We shall construct the sets Cj by induction on j. 
Actually, we shall fmd our sets Cj satisfying, in addition to (I) to (3) of the 
lemma, the following two properties: (4) for any j, the ordinals mentioned in 
the sequences in Cj are all members of Q, and (5) for anyj, given any lr in Q 
there is a sequence in Cj all of whose ordinals are larger than a. 
Construction of C,. Let R* denote the collection of all functions from 
the set of finite sequences of nonnegative integers into the set of nonnegative 
integers. It is routine to check that R* can be put into one to one correspon- 
dence with R and so we can apply our above facts about pigeon-holing now 
to maps from Q into IF?* rather than maps from Q in R. Thus if we define 
the map k from Q into R* by “for any a in Q /c(a) is the map in R* whose 
value at any sequence s is F(s, a)” (recall that F is I’s strategy for the 
auxiliary game), there exists an unbounded subset C, of Q on which k is 
constant. It is now easy to check that C, satisfies (1) through (5). In fact, (2) 
is the only nonobvious clause and it follows simply because for any a and /I 
in C,, since k(a) = k@). Ik(a)](s) = [k@)](s) for any sequence s of 
nonnegative integers, and so F(s, a) = F(s, a) for any sequence s of 
nonnegative integers. 
C, has been deJned and we wish C, + 1 : since C, satisfies clause (5), let, 
for each a in Q, /Jy,& . . ./I; be a sequence in C, whose least element, &, 
exceeds a. Then if we let the map g from Q into R* be given by “for any a 
in Q, g(a) is the map in lR* whose value at any sequence s is 
F(s, cO;L +, Pi, a)),” our pigeon-holing fact applies to give us an unbounded 
subset C;, , of Q on which g is constant. It is now immediate that if we 
define Ck+ , to be (lE,PY,..., &, a} 1 a E Cr+l}, Ck+, satisfies (1) through 
(5). By induction, the lemma follows. Our proof of GA-determinateness is 
now complete. I 
5 
The main point of the previous section was to introduce and motivate 
Martin’s technique for proving analytic sets of reals determinate. We now 
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actually give Martin’s original proof, namely. that which uses a large 
cardinal assumption to show that every analytic set of reals is determinate. 
It would probably be useful to restate here the outline of this section of the 
paper, We shall begin by paralleling the argument presented in Section 4 for 
proving G, sets determinate but here we will work with an analytic set rather 
than a G, set. All will go smoothly until the middle of the proof where it will 
become apparent that the trick used in Section 4 involving the pigeon-hole 
principle does not work for analytic sets. Here is where we will have to rely 
upon a large cardinal axiom. The motivational discussion associated with the 
axiom we wiil use appears further on in this section and can be read now if 
you wish. We complete the proof of analytic determinateness at the end of 
this section. 
Now for the proof: suppose A is a given analytic set-we would like to 
replace the game G,d with an “open” auxiliary game based on an appropriate 
representation theorem for analytic sets. 
Now what sort of representation theorem for A would we like? Well. in 
analogy with the G, case, there are two features it should have. The first is 
that as a real n,, nL, n,, n,, n, ,... is being produced there must 
simultaneously be produced an associated list of objects such that that real’s 
membership or nonmembership in A is directly related to the associated list 
having some property. And the second is that that property of the associated 
list be something which can potentially be “verified” as the list is being 
formed. For example, in the proof of G, determinateness the associated list 
was of open sets which had already “captured” the real being produced, the 
“property” of the list was that it be finite (in order for the real to not be in 
the G, at hand), and the “verification” of the list as it was being formed 
involved an attempt by player II to predict the list’s eventual length. The idea 
behind “verification” of the property of the list is that if a verification of the 
property proves successful then sure enough the property is true of the list. 
And conversely, if the property turns out to be false of the list then some 
verification would have told us so. 
At any rate, let us attempt to derive such a representation theorem for A. 
Well, since A is analytic there must exist a closed set C and a continuous 
function f such that A is the range of J on C. Thus for any real r, r is a 
member of A if and only if for some real f in C, r =f(t). Our eventual 
representation will involve a search, given an r, for a t such that r =ftt). 
And the key is that since C is closed (and hence has open complement) and f 
is continuous, such a search can be carried out as the real r is being built. 
Let us now get down to the details. We begin by recalling that by viewing 
reals as infinite sequences of nonnegative integers, a real is in a given open 
set if and only if it “already is so” based on some initial segment, that is, if 
and only if there is an initial segment of that real such that arzy real with that 
initial segment is in the open set. Let us call such initial segments “secured” 
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with respect to the open set. Thus since the complement of our closed set C 
is open, a real t is in C if and only if every initial segment oft is unsecured 
with respect to the complement of C. We next notice that by the basic B/E 
definition of continuous functions, ifg is any continuous function andp and 
q are reals such that g(p) = q then for any initial segment s of q there is an 
initial segment s’ of p such that any real with initial segment s’ is mapped via 
g to a real with initial segment s. (If s is the longest sequence of length at 
most that of 3’ such that any real with initial segment s’ is mapped via g to a 
real with initial segment s, then we shall denote s by g,V,.) At any rate, these 
two facts show that as a real r is being formed, one can try building a real t 
in C such that f(t) = r. For any finite sequence s’ unsecured with respect to 
the complement of C such that f,, is an initial segment of r is an initial 
segment of such a t. To push this a bit further, let us consider the partial 
ordering of the set of finite sequences of natural numbers defined by “U < v if 
and only iff, is a proper initial segment offU.” Then it is immediate that for 
any real r. r is a member of A if and only if there is a t in C such that 
f(t) = r if and only if there exists an infinite collection Q offinite sequences 
of natural numbers linearly ordered by < such that (1) each s in Q is 
unsecured with respect to the complement of C and (2) for each s in Q, f, is 
an initial segment of r. 
This is basically our desired representation theorem, but we would like to 
put it into slightly neater form. So let us extend our partial ordering < to a 
total ordering <* on the set of finite sequences of nonnegative integers 
defined by s <* s’ if and only iff,, is a proper initial segment off, or, at the 
first place the sequences f, and f,, differ, the integer at that place in J,, is 
larger. Then if we call a finite sequence s f-r-unsecured ifs is unsecured with 
respect to the complement of C and f, is an initial segment of r, we can state 
our desired representation theorem as follows: 
LEMMA, For any real r, r is a member of A if and only if <* is not a 
well-ordering of the f-r-unsecured sequences. 
Proof of lemma. If r is a member of A, let t be a member of C such that 
f(t) = r. Then clearly the set T of initial segments of the sequence t are allf- 
runsecured and yet T has no <*-least member. Conversely, suppose r is a 
real such that some set T of f-r-unsecured sequences has no least member, 
Pick sO in T. Since there must be infinitely many members of T <*-smaller 
than s,,, and since there are only finitely many sequences s such that at the 
first place the sequences s and s,, differ the integer at that place in s is 
smaller, there must be an s, in T such that sO is a proper initial segment of 
s,. Similarly there is an s2 in T such that s, is the proper initial segment of 
s2. Continuing in this way we can define an infinite sequence s,, s,, s2, 
$3 3 $4 7 85 ,**a of increasingly long members of T. If I is the limit of the si (that 
is, if f is the unique real u such that each si is an initial segment u) then 
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clearly 1 is a member of C and J’(f) = r. Thus r is a member of A. This 
completes the proof of the lemma. I 
It is now fairly easy to set up our auxillary open game to replace G,. For 
as a sequence of nonnegative integers r is being built (as, for example, when 
two people are engaged in playing G,) one can begin writing the associated 
list L of ,/lr-unsecured sequences. If, when r is completely built, <* welll 
orders the set of sequences appearing in this associated list. r is not in A. 
Thus in the auxiliary game player II’s goal is to “prove” that the associated 
list of finite sequences is well-ordered by <*. He will try to do this by 
attempting to map the associated list, as it comes out. order-preservingly into 
the ordinals. We can formally arrange this as follows: since there exist only 
countably many finite sequences of nonnegative integers let us arrange the 
process of writing the list associated (by our representation theorem) with a 
play of G, so that at most one finite sequence is added to this list at every 
other stage of play. Then the auxillary game G> is played as follows: the two 
players move alternately beginning with player 1. Player 1 writes a 
nonnegative integer at each of his moves and player II writes a nonnegative 
integer at each of his. But player II also has the option at each of his moves 
to write. as an auxillary move, an arbitrary ordinal number. The payoff is 
that player II wins a play of the auxillary game if and only if his ordinal 
moves constitute an order-preserving map of the associated list of f-r- 
unsecured sequences into the ordinals, that is, if and only if at each initial 
stage of play at which a new sequence gets placed in the associated list, 
player I1 wrote, at his next available move, an auxillary ordinal such that 
this association of ordinals with f-r-unsecured sequences preseves the <“- 
ordering. To put this another way, if we view player II’s writing an auxillary 
ordinal when a sequence gets listed as his mapping that sequence to the 
ordinal. then II wins the play of the auxillary game if and only if this 
mapping of finite sequences under <* into the ordinals under their usual 
ordering is order-preserving. It is routine to now see that this auxiliary game 
is open since if player II fails to make his mapping order-preserving he fails 
at some finite stage. Furthermore, if player II wins a play of it then the list of 
finite sequences associated by the representation theorem with the sequence 
of integer moves must be well-ordered under <*-after all, the usual ordering 
of the ordinals is a welllordering. Thus by the representation theorem we 
may argue as we did in proving Gsmdeterminateness to conclude that if 
player II has a winning strategy for the auxillary game he has one for the 
original game. Since the auxillary game is open, either player I or player 11 
has a winning strategy for it. and so we will have shown A determinate if we 
can prove that if player 1 has a winning strategy for the auxillary game he 
has one for the original game. As was the case with G,-determinateness, this 
is the point of difficulty in the proof. 
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Suppose F is a winning strategy for player I for G,. We would like to 
convert F into a winning strategy for I for G, and as before we must come 
up with some method for making ordinal guesses to supply to F. 
The situation here, however, is more difficult. For recall that even though 
the ordinal guesses are essential arguments to be fed into F so as to use F in 
playing the original game G,, these guesses must be such that they can be 
revised at a later time without changing Fs moves. Whereas in the case of 
G&-determinateness it is only a finite sequence of ordinals we later wanted to 
revise, here it is not. Thus, in the G, case we were able to complete the proof 
with out straightforward definition, by induction, of sets Ci of finite 
sequences of ordina1 guesses having the key property that any two sequences 
in a given set C, are “indiscernible” by F. For in doing our later revisions we 
simply replaced an original sequence with a new one in the same Ci. 
The case with analytic determinateness, however. is complicated by the 
fact that at the stage of argument where we would like to replace original 
ordinal guesses with new ones without anything else being changed (so as to 
have, as a contradiction, a play of Ga, where I used F and lost), it is an 
infinite sequence or ordinals which must be replaced. This is the point at 
which we must appeal to a large cardinal axiom. 
Our approach is to use a generalization of a well-known theorem of 
Ramsey. Ramsey’s idea is as follows: by a straightforward use of the pigeon- 
hole principle, given any positive integer n and any partition of the collection 
of n-element subsets of a given infinite set x into a finite number of pieces, 
there must exist infinitely many n-element subsets of x all of which lie in the 
same piece-it is just a minor variation of this which we used in proving G,- 
determinateness. But what, asked Ramsey, if we seek something more than 
just infinitely many n-element subsets of x all of which lie in the same piece: 
what if we ask for an infinite subset 4’ of x such that a11 n-element subsets of 
y lie in the same piece? Does there always exist such a set y for such 
partitions? Of course if n equals 1 the answer is obviously yes-this is just 
an instance of the pigeon-hole principle. But if n equals 2 or greater the 
situation is fairly difficult. The answer, however. remains yes. This is 
Ramsey’s theorem. 
In order to contrast the difference between Ramsey’s idea and mere 
pigeon-holing let us introduce the following simple notation: if z is any set 
and n is a positive integer let us denote by [z]” the collection of n-element 
subsets of z. Then if we denote by w the set of nonnegative integers, an 
instance of pigeon-holing is “for any mapf from [u]’ into a finite set there is 
an infinite subset u of lo]’ such that f is constant on u”--an instance of 
Ramsey’s theorem is “for any map f from [w]’ into a finite set there exists 
an infinite subset u of w such that f is constant on \v]‘.” 
There are various ways in which Ramsey’s theorem might be extended. 
One such extention is the following: given, for each positive integer n, a map 
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f, from [xl” into the set of reals, there exists an uncountable subset y of x 
with the property that for each n, f, is constant on 1 y 1”. Note that we have 
left open the question Of what x is. By the property stated we immediately 
set that x must be at least so big that it cannot be mapped one to one into 
the set of reals. As it turns out, though. any set x satisfying the above 
extension of Ramsey’s theorem must be very much larger than this. It must 
be larger than the set of sets of reals, the set of sets of sets of reals, and so 
forth. In fact. as we shall later discuss the existence of such a set k: cannot be 
proven in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory even with the axiom of choice and so 
we must assert its existence as a new axiom. 
In the next section we shall discuss more fully the considerations 
associated with using such sets ): in mathematics. For the moment, however, 
let us assume as a new axiom the assertion there exists u set ,y with the 
foliowi~tg property: given, for each positive integer n, a map f, from [,y 1” into 
the reals. there exists an uncountable subset y of x such that for each n f, is 
constani on 1 y In b and finish our proof that A is determinate. Now recall that 
we arc at the following point in our proof: we have defined an auxiliary 
game G!, and know that one of the players has a wnning strategy for G;. 
Furthermore we know that if player II has a winning strategy for G(, he has 
one for G,< and so we are assuming that F is a winning strategy for player I 
for G(,. In order to complete our argument we will convert F to a winning 
strategy for player I far G,4 ~ and in analogy with the G, case we will do this 
by looking for a method for player I’s making ordinal guesses. 
We proceed as follows: let x be a set of ordinals satisfying the property in 
our new axiom and for each n let us define a functionf, from 1x1” into the 
set of reals’ as follows: given {a,,.... a,} in [xl” we wish a value for 
fn(lal--. a,\). This must be a function from the set of finite sequences of 
nonnegative integers into the set of nonnegative integers and our definition is 
simply that the value of J,((a,...., a,}) at the finite sequence s is 
F(s, (ai, 1...1 ai,,)) where {ai, ,..., uiJ is just the rearrangement of (a ,,.,., a,} 
such that (s, (ai, ,...+ ai,)) is a partial play of G:, in which player II has not 
yet lost. (Note that there clearly exists such a unique rearrangement of 
(a 1 *...3 a,,} provided th t a associated with the partial play s precisely n 
sequences get placed in our associated list. If s does not have this property 
let us definefJ(c~,,.... a,})(s) to be &we will not really be interested in this 
case as the proof proceeds.) 
Now since x has the property stated in our new axiom, let J be an uncount- 
’ By the axiom of choice it turns out that every set can be put into one to one correspon 
dencc with a set of ordinals and so it is easy to see that we can. without loss of generality. 
take our set x to be a set of ordinals. 
’ Actually, as happened earlier. we will be using F. . )* the set of functions from the set of 
finite sequences of nonnegative integers into the set of nonnegative integers, instead of 113. the 
set of reals. here. 
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able subset of x such that for each n f, is constant on [VI”. It is now fairly 
easy to see that we can take y to be our desired “collection of ordinal 
guesses.” Specifically, let us define the strategy g for player I for G, as 
follows: given a partial play s (where there are precisely ti sequences in the 
list associated with s by the representation theorem) g(s) is simply 
Fh (q, ,..., aJ>, where each ai, is a member of ~1 and (aj ,,..., a,,) is a 
sequence such that (L (ai,,..,, a,,)) is a partial play of Gi, in which player II 
has not yet lost. Note that since the ordinals in y are “indiscernible by F’ 
our choice of just which ai we use in defining g(s) is irrelevant-we would 
get the same value for g(s) whichever a, we plugged into F. More impor- 
tantly, the indiscernibility of the ordinal: in 4’ by F easily yields that this 
strategy g is a winning strategy for player I for G,, For if not, let r be the 
result of a play of G, in which player I used g and lost. Then since r is not a 
member of A. the list associated with Y by the representation theorem, 
SI,S2~S3,S4,S5,“. is such that its members are well-ordered by <*. But since 
this set of si under <* is a countable well-ordered set it can be mapped in an 
order-preserving way into any uncountable well-ordered set. In particular it 
can be mapped order-preservingly into .v.* ITo see this is fairly easy: 
Suppose (A, <A) and (B, <B) are two well-orderings, A countable and B 
uncountable. To see that (A, cA) can be mapped order-preservingly into 
(B, cA) we first show that for every p in A there is a unique order-preserving 
map of (4 E A ( q GA ~7) onto an initial segment of B9: suppose not and let p 
be the <,-least member of A for which this is not true. For each q in A, 
q <,4 p, let h, be the unique order-preserving map of {r E A 1 r GA q} onto an 
initial segment of B. It is routine to check that because these maps h, are 
unique, they extend one another (that is, if r <A q ca p then h, restricted to 
{t ) t GA r} is just A,). Thus we can define a map from {q 1 q <,4 p} into B by 
h(q) =dfhJq). Furthermore since A is countable it is easy to check that the 
range of h is a countable initial segment of B. Since B is uncountable let u 
denote the (,-least member of B not in the range of h. Then it is routine to 
check that the map h’ of {q j q GA p} into B given by 
h’(q) = h(q) if 4 CA P 
=U if q=p 
is the unique order-preserving map of (q 14 GA p) onto an initial segment of 
B. This is a contradiction. We can now immediately see how to map A 
order-preservingly into B. For if, for each p in A, h, is the unique map from 
‘The following 21 lines constitute a proof that any countable well-ordered set can be 
mapped order-preservingly into any uncountable one. Some readers may wish to temporarily 
skip this lemma and proceed with the next paragraph. 
’ An initial segment of a well-ordering (W, <) is a subset Q of W such that whenever u is in 
W and u < U, 1: is in IV. 
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(9 ) y S& p) onto an initial segment of B then as before, h defined by 
h(p) = h,(p) is an order-preserving map of A into B. 1 
At any rate, since this set of si under <* can be mapped order- 
preservingly into j’ let si I--+ /Ii represent one such map. Then consider the 
play of GI,. where I and II make integer moves and form r and II, each time 
a finite sequence si gets placed in the associated list writes the ordinal pi. 
This is easily seen to be a play of G; in which I played his winning strategy 
F and lost. From this contradiction the theorem follows. fl 
6 
We would now like to spend some time discussing Ramsey’s idea and 
related partition properties such as that used in proving analytic sets deter- 
minate. 
Recall that Ramsey’s theorem states that given an infinite set A, a positive 
integer II, and a partition of ]A]” into a finite number of pieces there exists 
an infinite subset B of A such that ]B 1” is entirely contained within one of 
the pieces of the partition. This seemingly mysterious generalization of the 
pigeon-hole principle is really quite natural when viewed slightly differently: 
given an ordered set (A, <) and an n-place property P(~,,...,x,,) which 
applies to members of A, let us call a subset B of A a set of order- 
iudiscernibles for P if given any two sequences b, < 6, < ..’ < b, and 
L’, < Cl < ... < c, of members of B, P is true of (bt,..., 6,) if and only if P is 
true of (c,,..., cn). Then an immediate consequence of the pigeonhole prin- 
ciple is simply that given any infinite ordered set and any l-place property 
there exists an infinite set of order-indiscernibles for that property. Ramsey’s 
theorem is simply the same thing but for arbitrary properties instead of just 
1 -place properties. This is the context in which Ramsey discovered his 
theorem. 
It is not at all difficult to prove Ramsey’s theorem. We proceed by proving 
by induction on n that given any positive integer n, any infinite set A, and 
any partiton F of ]A jn into a finite number of pieces there exists an infinite 
subset C of A such that ]C]” is entirely contained within just one of the 
pieces of the partition (such a set C is said to be homogeneous for the 
partition F): If II = 1 we simply have an instance of the pigeon-hole principle 
and so this case is immediate. Now suppose as our inductive hypothesis that 
the theorem is true for IZ = k and that for some infinite set A F is a partition 
of (A]h” into m-many pieces. Let us view F as a map from [A 1” + ’ into 
{ 1, 2,.... m}. We wish to fmd an infinite homogeneous set for I;, that is, an 
infinite subset C of A such that F is constant on [Cl”’ ‘. Our method will be 
to use the inductive hypothesis by considering partitions FPr for p in A, 
defined as follows: given a member p of A F, maps IA - ( p}lk into 
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{ I, L., m} by Fp,Cr) =dl Ff$ U {p}). We shall use homogeneous sets for 
various F, in finding our desired homogeneous set For F. Proceeding formally, 
we define by induction a sequence pO, p, , p2, p3, pa, p5 ,... of elements of A 
and a sequence C, , C,, C,, C,, C,,... of subsets of A as follows: p0 is any 
member of A and C, is any subset of A homogeneous for FpO. Once pj-, and 
Cj have been defined we let pj be any member of Cj and let Cj+, be a set 
homogeneous for the partition Fpj restricted to [Cj - { pi}lk. The result of 
this construction is that for any pj, in our sequence, {pi/i > j,} is 
homogeneous for Fp,. Thus let us call pjo an I-point if the range of FpiO on 
i~P,lwMl k is 1. By the pigeon-hole principle there is some I, between 1 
and m such that infinitely many pj’s are all /,-points. If C denotes this set of 
I,,-points it is easy to check that C is our desired infinite set homogeneous for 
F. This completes our proof of Ramsey’s theorem. 1 
Now what about the possibility of proving various extensions of Ramsey’s 
theorem? For example, what about the partition property used to complete 
our proof of analytic determinateness ? As we examine this problem we 
immediately see that there are three directions in which we would like to 
extend. First of all, although our proof of Ramsey’s theorem produces count- 
abie homogeneous sets, our proof of analytic determinateness required an 
uncountable homogeneous set. Secondly, Ramsey’s theorem comments on 
partitions into finitely many pieces whereas our proof of analytic deter- 
minatenss involved partitions into uncountably many pieces. And finally, in 
the property used in proving analytic determinateness a single set 
homogeneous simultaneous for infinitely many given partitions is used. Can 
we routinely find such sets? 
As it turns out the first two forms of generalization are possible in ZFC 
and the third is not. Indeed, by a simple (though subtle) modification of 
Ramsey’s original argument it is easy to prove that given a positive integer n 
and a set I there exists a set u “so large” that given any partition F mapping 
Iu]” into z there exists an uncountable subset u of u homogeneous for F. But 
by various techniques of set theory, one can show that ZFC is not strong 
enough to prove the existence of a set u with the property that for any coun- 
table collection of partitions of the form F: lu]” --* z there exists a single 
infinite set homogeneous for all of them. Any such set x turns out to be 
larger than anything definable with just the axioms of ZFC. Even for the 
case in which t is a set with just 2 elements the associated x must be larger 
than the set of reals, the set of sets of reals, the set of sets of sets of reals, 
and so forth ad infinitum. Perhaps more to the point, is that the existence of 
such a set x implies that ZFC is consistent, and thus by the well-known 
theorem of Giidel that no sufficiently rich consistent axiomatic theory can 
prove its own consistency, we must conclude that no set with this property 
can be proved to exist in ZFC. 
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So where does this leave us with respect to proving theorems by assuming 
rhe existence of such sets x? Must they remain corollaries of some relatively 
obscure nonprovable partition property ? Not necessarily. For a start, the 
property used in proving analytic determinateness is itself provable from a 
quite well-known set theoretic axiom, namely, that asserting the existence of 
a measurable cardinal. But more important is that the basic method used in 
proving analytic determinateness can be modified so as to eliminate depen- 
dence upon a nonprovable partition property. An example of this appears in 
our proof of G, determinateness given in Section 4. Quite impressively, such 
a large cardinal inspired proof provided the first correct argument in zFC 
for the determinateness of Gaob sets (countable intersections of countable 
unions of G,‘s). This theorem had been a key open question for many years 
and it is a good bet that it would never have been proved as early as it was 
were it not for Martin’s original proof, using a large cardinal, of analytic 
determinateness. (Note: It turns out that analytic determinateness itself is not 
provable within ZFC.) 
So far as a general study of the different large cardinal axioms and the 
relationships between them is concerned, the theory is extensive indeed. 
Some of these axioms can be stated in terms of partition properties and some 
in terms of the existence of various types of measures. Others must be stated 
in terms of entirely different concepts. And quite remarkably, these 
seemingly independent axioms ae not independent at all. Some directly imply 
others, some have the same consequences as others, and so forth. And after a 
fairly extensive look at large cardinal theory one begins to feel that such 
coincidence provides compelling evidence for the “correctness” of these 
axioms-the isolated “reasonable” guesses at ways to extend ZFC have 
turned out to cohere dramatically. 
But at the moment, the mathematically most interesting aspect of large 
cardinal theory lies not in the details of the theory itself nor in the fact that 
this theory seems to be “correctly” extending mathematics. Rather it lies in 
the applications to standard mathematics inspired by large cardinal axioms. 
A case in point, as indicated earlier, is the technique we presented in showing 
analytic sets of reals determinate. And hopefully, large-cardinal-inspired 
techniques will be applied to more conventional mathematics as well. The 
potential is certainly present and ought definitely to be explored. 
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